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Unscanned, each stroke's an autonomous piece,
a nuanced beat
of melting pursuit, conscious of dirt. The scarred
sequestered ones
scale back, spring-balanced to constrict
on sight. Unnerved,

Theory and rationality:
Extending the Foucault/Habermas debate

the spiral vessels lean, their craft unstuck,
swept up
to slicker peaks, glanced by tongues pressed
between lips,

Review essay by Arnold L. Farr
Department of Philosophy, University of Kentucky

unseemly text, parenthesis, love's husk.

Critical Theory
Acerbic beauty, split at the cusp, splinters
the skin to acephalous
song, the severed a pivot slowing the turns,
pacing the loss,
sieved meaning unriddled, sheathed, gone.
Forked root
squeezed in, springs apart, ascetic luxury
spent seedily,
but well-decided, this doubled deciphering.
Ignoble, imprecise,
this split pintle's my clean piece of cultch.

David Hoy and Thomas McCarthy
Blackwell Publishers, 1994

Recovering Ethical Life: Jurgen Habermas and the Future of Critical Theory
J.M. Bernstein
Routledge, 1995

In the twentieth century reason has become an object of interrogation and suspicion. Reason is no longer simply accepted as an infallible authority or as the
highest court of appeal, but rather, it has become suspect as a force of domination
and oppression, and as a system of distorted communication. If reason is taken to
be oppressive rather than emancipatory, what then is the status of theory, and how
do we judge or justify any moral or ethical position? Can we justify any appeal to
reason at all? These questions constitute the central themes of this issue of disC/osure and the texts by Bernstein, and Hoy and McCarthy. By reading these authors
against each other, we should be able to see what is at stake in the reassessment of
theory and reason.
The interrogation of reason in the twentieth century has probably received its
greatest momentum from critical theory. The status of reason, theory, and critical
theory is debated by Hoy and McCarthy in Critical Theory. In Part One McCarthy
examines the task of critical theory and both the use and critique of reason. In Part
Two Hoy assesses the status of critical theory and attempts to fuse critical theory
with a Foucaultian critical history. Hoy and McCarthy provide rejoinders to each
other in Part Three.

In Part One McCarthy examines the relation between critical theory and phi- ----....._._.~
losophy. Critical theory has its origin in the Kantian critique of reason but unlike
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the Kantian critique of reason, critical theory offers "a materialist account of its
(reason's) nature, conditions and limits." [p. 9] The task of critical theory is not to

McCarthy suggests that this is where Habermas makes a significant contribution.

overthrow reason nor merely to examine its limits, but rather, to critically reconstruct Enlightenment conceptions of reason and the rational subject while being

cognitive component in socialization. In other words, the individual social actor or

aware of the socio-cultural forms that reason assumes. Here, conceptions of reason

ply determined by the preestablished social order. The actor's own knowledge of

are examined in their embeddedness in historical life. Hence, any 'idea' of reason
belongs to a conception of reason which is not purely universal, or ahistorical, but
rather, is produced by the flow of history and its relevant social structures.

social norms is treated as epiphenomenal. For McCarthy, social actors are not only

McCarthy provides a brief assessment of some contemporary critics in the second chapter (such as Derrida, Rorty, and Foucault) and their criticisms of traditional
conceptions of reason. Finding each of them inadequate for a variety of reasons,
McCarthy direct his attention to the critical theory of Jurgen Habermas. The most

McCarthy claims that received views of socialization have tended to overlook the
agent is viewed as merely a "judgmental" or "cultural dope" whose actions are sim-

participants, but are also observers within their particular social context, and are
capable of oscillating between first, second and third person perspectives. Recognition of this capacity allows people from diverse cultures to participate in a multicultural universal discourse. It is this potential to participate in a multicultural universal discourse, free of coercion, that is the substance of ideas of reason as appropriated by a theory of communicative action.

salient feature of Habermas' theory of communicative action is that it is not only an

In the second part of the book, Hoy discusses the relation between critical the-

attempt to offer an account of the ways in which truth claims are historically situated

ory and critical history. Hoy attempts to show that critical history is the more viable

and culturally conditioned, but it also examines the situation-transcending import of

option of the two by exposing certain tensions and contradictions in critical theory.

these claims. McCarthy claims that Habermas reconstructs a social-practical analogue to Kant's ideas of reason. That is, real communication is predicated on a form
of ideal communication.

He claims that the conflict between traditional and critical theory as depicted by

According to Habermas, ideal communication or the ideal speech situation is a
situation wherein communication is free of coercion, violence, distortion and domi-

terms due to the nature of theory itself. Hence, Hoy prefers the use of the term

nation. Although all real communication is historically situated, it aims at something that is not yet historically or culturally bound, but rather, is the condition for
historically and culturally bound communication. The very notion in critical theory
that communication can be and is distorted presupposes at least the concept of undistorted or ideal communication. In this organizing activity lies the potential for
reason.
McCarthy's discussion of ethnomethodology in chapter three inaugurates his
attempt to overthrow the belief that human beings are "judgmental dopes" whose
actions are simply determined by preestablished behavioral norms provided by a
common culture. The insight of ethnomethodology is that the order which the social
scientist discovers in society is an order that is given to society by rational social
agents, not merely by "judgmental dopes." The ethnomethodologist seeks to examine the rational properties of practical activities. This implies that social order has a
cognitive-normative basis rather than a mere normative basis. However, while ethnomethodology does provide us with a notion of rational agency which is still historically situated, it does not account for the situation-transcending power of reason.
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Horkheimer in "Traditional and Critical Theory" is a meta-theoretical debate between different "theories of theory." Hoy also finds the use of the term "theory" in
critical theory to be problematic. To label a theory critical is a contradiction in
"critical history". Hoy claims that critical theory is not transparent and the use of
terms like "inhuman" presupposes a grasp of the social whole. As "theory" critical
theory is bound to make general claims about the total social configuration. But, in
order to be critical it must be suspicious of all totalizing claims.
Hoy concludes chapter four with an interpretation of the Dialectic of Enlight-

enment and Negative Dialectics, which anticipate poststructuralism. The most salient feature of the Dialectic of Enlightenment is that it exposes the source of the
Enlightenment and provides us with an account of how critical history is possible.
Hoy argues that ''the enlightenment narrows down the range of the rational to what
can be known with specific methods, thereby excluding whatever does not fit into
this domain." [p. 125] Thus, the very goal of the Enlightenment is rooted in fear,
and the consequence of such thinking is conformism. However, Hoy criticizes
Adorno and Horkheimer because their critique of the Enlightenment is parasitic on
the Enlightenment itself. Hoy claims that Adorno and Horkheimer merely wanted
to lead the Enlightenment to a ''truly enlightened" position by releasing it from entanglement in blind domination. Hence, while the Dialectic of Enlightenment
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shows us how a critical history is possible, it never fully achieves the status of a
critical history.
Hoy points out that critical history is exemplified in the works of Foucault. In
chapter five Hoy claims that French postructuralism is a way of continuing the tradition of critical theory. He argues that Habermas' attempt to eliminate the tensions
and deferrals of the early critical theorists leads him to propose a philosophical
project that appears to be more like what Horkheimer calls traditional theory. According to Hoy, Habermas is interested in a theory of reason whereas Foucault is
interested in the historicity of reason. A theory of reason merely constructs a theory
of what rationality really is. Foucault's genealogy attempts to understand the present by unmasking present fonns of rationality. These present forms are not ahistorical but have their origin in history. That is, rationality develops in the course of
historical practices. Once we see how a form of rationality develops historically, it
loses its status as necessary and universal. Hoy concludes chapter five with a brief
discussion ofHabermas' project of "rational reconstruction" and offers a critique of
this project from the perspective of the genealogists.
If Habermas' critical theory seems to be nothing more than traditional theory, is
critical theory still possible? In chapter six Hoy reconstructs critical theory as genealogical hermeneutics. Habermas' project fails to assist in the triumph of critical
theory over traditional theory because his ''theory of communicative action does not
construct an account of what makes an epistemological or ethical claim valid." [p.
173] For this reason Habermas can be seen as offering a ground or foundation for
social theory that is symptomatic of traditional theory. Such a project overlooks the
contingent character of social formations and thereby overlooks the contingent char-
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In Part Three Hoy and McCarthy respond to the arguments set fourth in Parts
One and Two. Hoy and McCarthy criticize each other on numerous points. I shall
select only a couple of these points for discussion here since they are too numerous
to treat in the space of this review. McCarthy states that the disagreement between
himself and Hoy comes down to whether there is anything universal to say at all
about reason, truth and objectivity. He sums up Hoy's criticisms under four principal themes: (1) pragmatism, (2) genealogy, (3) hermeneutics, and (4) pluralism.
McCarthy attempts to show how critical theory does account for or include these
four themes. He claims that Hoy's use of them to criticize critical theory is rooted
in a misunderstanding of the aims of critical social theory. For example: with respect to pragmatism, McCarthy claims that critical social theory's interest in "grand
metanarratives" is practically motivated and seeks to aid in the construction of critical histories of the present. These narratives serve as "interpretive frameworks for
historically oriented, critical analyses of contemporary society." [p. 219] Such interpretive frameworks do not provide a "God's-eye" view, but rather, they provide a
"reflective participants" view. Further, the metanarrative used in critical social theory does not attempt to account for every detail of every aspect of our society, but
rather, they only attempt to see how things hang together and what are our alternatives.
For McCarthy the charge of ''totalizing discourse" is a false accusation with respect to critical social theory.

Although critical social theory employs "grand

metanarratives," these narratives do not aim at any kind of totality or finality, but
rather, they are engaged in an ongoing act of "constructing, deconstructing, and
reconstructing ,"big pictures" of basic structures, processes, and interdependencies,"
and therefore, have pragmatic value. [p. 221]

acter of theory. Habermas still seeks a theory that is grounded in some notion of
universal necessity. The genealogist does not seek to validate any epistemological

McCarthy claims that genealogy is an essential part of critical social theory to

or ethical claim but merely seeks to "see as strange what culture takes to be famil-

the extent that (like Foucault) critical social theory aims at understanding ''the ways

iar." (p. 174] This can be accomplished only by doing a critical history of the famil-

in which reason and rationality have been socially constructed, as a means of

iar. What is revealed in this critical history is the contingent character of the famil-

achieving a critical self-understanding with implications for practice." [p. 225]

iar. The validity that Habermas ascribes to certain epistemological and ethical
claims is subject to suspicion when familiar social structures and ideas which have

Critical social theory differs from Foucaultian genealogy in its attitude toward the

been thought to be necessary are shown to be contingent. Hence, epistemological

possible emancipatory dimension of enlightenment. McCarthy also claims that the
notion of a "pure" genealogy is a myth. That is, that Foucault also made use of

and ethical claims are merely interpretations which do not represent a single,

general schemes and perspectives.

monolithic, universal truth, but rather, they represent a plurality of perspectives
which are historically situated.

The hermeneutical problem lies in the question whether or not contexttranscending validity claims are possible. While philosophical henneneutics claims
that the understanding is bounded by its context, McCarthy claims that the claims of
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general theories broadens the invitation to join the discussion. It is with respect to a

ing and contesting reasons are essential to social discussion and criticism. He disa-

broader discussion that the henneneutical problem overlaps with the problem of
pluralism.

grees with McCarthy that the validity of these reasons must be agreed to by everyone. He believes that McCarthy's notion of "context transcendence" goes too far.
Hoy finds McCarthy's idea of a "universal audience" quite problematic. For Hoy,

The problem of pluralism is similar if not identical to the henneneutical problem
of a multiplicity of interpretations. Hoy takes a Gadamerian position on interpreta-

tion. He employs Gadamer's notion of "Sache

JI

which is what the dialogue is

about. Although for Gadamer (according to Hoy) interpretation should be guided
by the "Sache," it does not follow that these interpretations may or should fonnulate
an ideal, universal discourse. Not only are interpretations bounded by a particular
context, but, the "Sache

JI

insofar as this "universal audience" must agree on a single, ideal interpretation of
social reality, McCarthy's position may be characterized as "critical monism". Hoy
claims that "critical monism" does not take seriously enough the way in which interpretations are bounded by contexts. That is, the critical monist seeks an interpretation of social reality that is detached enough from any particular social context to
warrant agreement by everyone.

itself is bound by a context which evolves and changes

with the history of interpretation. Therefore, interpretation must always be open-

If interpretations are bounded by a particular context, how does Hoy avoid rela-

ended. (p. 189-190] For Hoy the attempt to arrive at a consensus or universal
agreement prematurely closes the possibility for further interpretation.

tivism? Hoy adopts the henneneutic notion of " solidarity'' as a more realistic and
realizable goal than McCarthy's notion a "universal audience". "Solidarity'' is the
"social glue" or perhaps the common interests, backgrounds, etc... , that holds

McCarthy claims that the critical theory of the Habennasian sort is not opposed
to pluralism. (p. 238] Critical theory does not presuppose that "discourse should
always lead to rational agreement, but that it should be carried out as if rational

groups together. One criticism of the notion of " solidarity'' is that it is exclusive.
However, Hoy argues that the Gadamerian notion of "solidarity'' is inclusive. Not
only does it play a role in community formation, but it also plays a role in the ex-

agreement about which is the right, or at least, best interpretation were possible." [p.

pansion of communities. Hoy states that Foucault viewed the "we" that is fonned

242] This still requires a multiplicity of interpretations- however, each interpretation must be held accountable for its claims.

through solidarity as a forward-looking "we" . The tendency of this forward-looking

Hoy's rejoinder is also centered around four principal themes: (I) rational
agents vs. cultural dopes, (2) local solidarities vs. universal audience, (3) pluralism
vs. consensus, and (4) identity in difference. Hoy claims that genealogy does not
incline one to believe that persons are merely "cultural dopes". Although selfunderstandings are shaped by social practices, social subjects are often conscious of
shaping their self-understanding through these social practices. Therefore, geneal-

"we" is to fonn a community of action. [p. 259]
For Hoy, the "we" that is presupposed in McCarthy' s ''universal audience"
looks too far forward. That is, McCarthy's "universal audience" is final. The notion of solidarity does not entail the notion of finality because although it starts
locally, it expands and widens its interpretations ''through forward-looking encounters with others." (p. 262] However, there is no single solidarity at the end of the
process.

ogy does not deny agency and we are not simply zombies that are moved about by
invisible forces. However, we are affected by social forces and structures in ways

The value of pluralism for Hoy is that it allows us to constantly expand our in-

that are not fully transparent to us. Hence, we cannot be fully transparent to our-

terpretations. He states that: " On the pluralistic henneneutic account as I recon-

selves and therefore, we are not always able to give reasons for what we do. The

struct it, what one aims at is an understanding of the subject matter and not agree-

self-descriptions that social agents offer are valuable but are not the whole story.

ment as such." [p. 266] Consensus is not the primary goal of social discourse be-

Self-description and self-understanding still develop within a particular social context.

cause it may preclude our arriving at an understanding of social reality. Since social
reality or social contexts are always changing, it is necessary that we continue to
strive for new interpretations.

Interpretations of social reality are rooted in our self-understanding, which is
bound by a particular social context. Is this the basis for ethical and social relativism? Not according to Hoy. Hoy claims that he and McCarthy agree that warrant-
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Hoy concludes his rejoinder with a brief assessment of the similarities between
his and McCarthy's positions. Hoy claims that both positions are pragmatic, how-
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ever, McCarthy maintains certain unnecessary assumptions that must be purged.

manipulation, and technical control. It is here that "cultural rationalization" and

The claims made by Hoy may be summed up in the following propositions: I. All
validity claims are interpretations and are bounded by a context, and must be

communication are distorted. With the scientization of politics and the loss of the
public sphere comes a loss of liberty. Chapter two is an examination of Habermas'

checked against other interpretations. Therefore, the ideal of competent judges is
"pragmatically unnecessary". [p. 268] 2. McCarthy claims that the ideal of un-

conception of the ideal speech situation which Bernstein claims is a rewriting of the
Kantian "Kingdom of Ends." The ideal speech situation is a model of autonomy

conditional truth aids in the discovery of "hidden conditions" while still allowing

and uncoerced agreement which is implicit in every communicative act.

for some indeterminacy in the background of argumentation. This indeterminacy
suggest that there are always hidden factors which lead to a plurality of interpretations. [p. 269] 3.Both Hoy and McCarthy seek to avoid complacency and parochialism, while respecting the plurality of social differences, but they disagree on which
philosophical perspective makes this possible.

In Recovering Ethical Life: Jurgen Habermas and the Future of Critical Theory, Bernstein lays out what he considers to be the essential problems addressed by
critical theory, and then provides an analyses of the way in which Habermas has
tried to come to terms with these issues. In Chapter One Bernstein claims that critical theory is not merely concerned with the problem of domination but also with
the problem of meaning. Nihilism may be understood as the problem of reason, and
with the problem of domination constitute the two sources of critical theory. The
problem of the way in which nihilism and justice are intertwined and resolved is the
source of critical theory's return to traditional theory. The problem of nihilism is
rooted in the Weberian problem of "cultural rationalization." Through "cultural
rationalization" traditional norms, values and meanings lose their cultural place and
critical force. There is a correlation between "cultural rationalization" and the es-

In chapter three Bernstein discusses Habermas' use of Freudian psychoanalysis
as a means of reflection whereby the acquisition of self-knowledge makes possible
the emancipation from distorted communicative relations. What is of particular
interest to Bernstein is Habermas' Hegelian reading of Freud. According to Bernstein, Habermas "interprets repression and its overcoming in terms of the causality
of fate and the dialectic of moral life." [p. 82] That is, the Freudian notion of
transference is viewed as a dialectical encounter between analyst and analysand,
whereby: ''the analyst can only have knowledge of the object (the analysand) if the
analysand transforms himself into a subject; and the analysand can only do this if he
recognizes in the analyst his suppressed life." [p. 82] The subject recognizes himself as subject only to the extent that he recognizes himself in the "other". Recognition of oneself in the "other" is the ground for emancipation and ethical life.
In his appropriation of Freud, Habermas attempts to examine the role that selfreflection and self-knowledge plays in emancipation. However, the self that is disclosed is not simply an autonomous, self-conscious individual self or subject, but

tablishment of institutions (or systems of domination) over persons. Critical theory

rather, a self that is embedded in a web of intersubjective relations. For this reason
Habermas chooses the Hegelian notion of the causality of fate (wherein recognition

develops "through its diagnosis of the meaning and consequences of rationalization." [p. 26]

of oneself in the other constitutes a dialectical relationship between subjects who are
engaged in a struggle between love, hate, and recognition) over the Kantian moral
theory which stresses autonomy and law. The key question raised by Bernstein is

Bernstein claims that for Habermas the rationalization of the lifeworld is in itself progressive but becomes nihilistic due to its deformation. Habermas attempts to

whether or not Habermas' "subject of an undistorted communication community" is
a logical fiction like Kant' s "logical subject". [p. 86] Like Hoy, Bernstein chal-

remedy this problem with his theory of communicative action or communicative
reason. Bernstein's examination of Habermas' project is an attempt to see whether
or not Habermas adequately treats the problem of justice and meaning without falling into the pitfalls of traditional theory.

lenges Habermas' idealization of communicative rationality.

Habermas' theory of communicative action takes as its model the classical un-

~erstanding of politics as normative, which concerns itself with the "good life". This
ts contrasted with the scientization of politics wherein politics is no longer ethical or
synonymous with the public sphere, but instead, it becomes the domain of expertise,

disC/osure: REASON INCorporated

The aim of Bernstein's critique of Habermas from chapters four through six is to
see whether or not the theory of communicative reason can be intelligibly perceived
as a reconstruction of the causality of fate doctrine. He claims that with Habermas'
linguistic turn, the reconstruction of the causality of fate doctrine becomes problematic. Bernstein opens chapter four with a discussion of Rousseau's consideration of the formative conflict between the self as preference maximizer and the self
as citizen. This conflict leads to the formation of "double men," that is, these two

disClosure S (1996): REASON JNCorporated

136

Arnold Farr

Theory and Rationality

137

conflicting sources of our education cancel each other out, thereby, resulting in

the Kantian notion of reflective judgment wherein we create universals under which

nihilism. Bernstein claims that Habermas' division of moral discourse from ethical
discourse sanctions the lives of modem double men, thereby sanctioning the very

particulars are subsumed. [p. 200] Hence, new horizons of meaning are created,
which inform social actions. Theoretical activity for Castoriadis is nothing more

nihilism that it strives to overcome.

than elucidation from within history of what being in history means. This emphasis
on meaning places Castoriadis within the hermeneutic tradition. Bernstein uses

Bernstein demonstrates this by examining

Habermas' critique of Durkheim and his appropriation of Mead.

Castoriadis' theory of elucidation as a means for critiquing Habermas' prising apart

In chapter five Bernstein surveys Seyla Benhabib's critique of Habermas in her

of meaning and validity, which for Bernstein is detrimental to critical theory.

Critique, Norm, and Utopia. Benhabib claims that Habermas' theory of communitheory on a conception of the "generalized other" which stresses the way in which

In The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, Habermas criticizes Castoriadis
and others (e.g., Foucault, Derrida, Heidegger etc... ,) for taking "subject centered

human beings are the same and are thereby entitled to certain rights. Benhabib

reason" as the whole of reason. Hence, the recent interrogation of reason is only the

thinks that this notion of the "generalized other'' is symptomatic of the liberal tradition and falls into the pitfalls of what Adorno calls "identity thinking." In contrast

interrogation of "subject-centered reason." "Subject-centered reason is the reason
and rationality of the transcendental subject." [p. 197] According to Habermas it is

to the notion of the "generalized other" Benhabib proposes the notion of the
"concrete other." If moral discourse is restricted to norms which are derived from

"subject-centered reason" that is responsible for totalizing discourse and domina-

cative action is too formalistic and empty. Following Mead, Habermas bases his

the concept of the "generalized other," then moral discourse is incomplete insofar as
it overlooks concrete ethical identities. It is only through local reason as opposed to

tion. However, for Bernstein it is Habermas' rejection of the subject and prising
apart of meaning and validity which is problematic and ultimately destroys meaning
and culminates in nihilism. Bernstein claims that: "The unconditionality of validity

universal reason that we are able to interpret the needs and desires of others in such

claims does require us to discount our subjectivity, which is to make whatever is

a way that they can become active, emancipated participants in moral and ethical
discourse.

agreed to as a consequence meaningless for us. Communicative rationality drives

Chapters six and seven are correctives to the problematic areas in Habermas'

Bernstein seeks to recover subjectivity and the unity of validity and meaning.

thought. Bernstein contends that the separation of moral and ethical discourses (as
discussed in chapter four) leads Habermas to see the conditioned and the unconditioned as lying at different levels. This is problematic because the kind of selfknowledge required for emancipation cannot be detached from the conditions which

He raises some of the same issues that are raised by Hoy and McCarthy, but, with a
slightly different emphasis. The debate between Hoy and McCarthy is largely a

make it possible. In affirming self-knowledge we also affirm its conditions
(negativity). This is absolute or unconditioned knowledge in the Hegelian sense.

out subjectivity." [p. 220]

debate about the status of theory or what type of theory must a critical theory of
society be. In this debate, there is a prising apart of meaning and validity, with Hoy
defending a theory of interpretation or meaning, and McCarthy defending a theory
of validity. The issue of subjectivity is not raised directly by Hoy and McCarthy

Hence, the universality of moral discourse or the validity of universal moral claims
must be grounded in the particular. Here, Bernstein argues for the employment of

(unless one takes their discussion of social agents to be one about social subjects,
which in that case it is McCarthy who defends the subject). I take Bernstein's book

reflective judgment. Bernstein relies on the distinction made between determinate

to be an extension of the debate between Hoy and McCarthy, although the two texts
seem to go in very different directions on certain points. Nevertheless, they both
examine very similar and at times the same issues. It would be appropriate to situate

and reflective judgment by Kant in the Critique ofJudgment. In reflective judgment
particular ethical identities are not subsumed under universals, but rather, it makes
possible the creating of universals under which we do our subsuming. Hence,

Bernstein somewhere between Hoy and McCarthy in the debate about the status of

Bernstein defends Castoriadis against Habermas' criticisms in chapter seven.

theory and rationality. It seems that while Bernstein would probably offer some
interesting criticisms of Hoy and McCarthy, it also seems that he holds an uneasy

While Habermas believes that it is intersubjectivity and communicative rationality that have been suppressed by traditional theory, Castoriadis claims that it is the

alliance with both of them.

creative dimension of human action that has been suppressed. Castoriadis employs
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Critical Theory and Recovering Ethical Life are two very remarkable books.
These books are written for an academic audience whose interests lie in the present
status of theory and rationality whether in philosophy or the social sciences in general. The authors of both books have shown extreme sensitivity in their examination
of the way in which the debate has unfolded and also to the intricate details in the

Cultural Theory and Intellectual Politics

arguments of those involved in the debate. While neither book offers a complete
and satisfactory answer to questions about the status of reason in contemporary
theoretical discoures, they do elucidate quite well the problems with traditional

An Interview with Russell Berman
Department of German Studies, Stanford University

conceptions of reason and the way in which these conceptions have been responded
to. The authors have at least made more visible the many tensions involved in any
discussion of rational discourse, such as the problematic relationship between interpretation and validity claims, and have presented to us the more salient possibilities

Conducted by Jennifer Kopf, Credmon Staddon
disClosure Editorial Collective

for the continuation of rational discourses. Through my own reading of these texts I
have been forced to think about rationality from a variety of perspectives. Each
book represents an important moment in contemporary debates on rationality and

Lexington, Kentucky
Saturday, February 11, 1995

stands as an invitation to all who are interested in and are willing to participate in
the debate.
This interview with the German Studies and Cultural Theory scholar Russell
Berman took place in the context of his invited lecture to the Interdisciplinary
Committee on Social Theory's Spring Lecture Series at the University of Kentucky.
That lecture, entitled "Imperialism and Enlightenment," discussed the relations between philosophical models of enlightenment and the Western colonial project. The
interview picks up on this general theme, but brings it into such contemporary contexts as German unification and the economic collapse of the Soviet Bloc. Also
discussed are the epistemological and political statuses of Cultural Studies, which
Berman sees as deeply problematic. Throughout the discussion Berman is concerned also to raise the idea that cultural authenticity cannot be restricted to the old
centre I margin dichotomy, which he partially deconstructs. The interview concludes with some discussion of the points of convergence between German Critical
Theory and French Poststructuralism.

Culture, Nation, Identity and Contemporary Cultural Studies
disClosure: When you are talking about imperialism and enlightenment in your
book Cultural Studies of Modern Germany: History, Representation and Nationhood, you often refer back to the connections between "culture," "nation" and
"identity"; for example, when you are talking about the Gulf War, you refer back to
"culture-nation-identity" as a kind of explanatory triad. We thought that the dis-
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